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Abstract: Labour-controlled investment is often touted as an alternative, pro-worker form of 
finance. Since 1983, the province of Québec in Canada has experimented with workers 
participation in the form of workers funds controlled by the two major trade union federations. 
Drawing on research from secondary sources, archival material and semi-structured interviews, 
this paper offers a comprehensive portrait of one of Québec main workers’ funds, the FTQ 
Solidarity Fund. To date very little has been said about the impact of workers funds on firm 
governance, employment quality and labour relations. We argue that any attempt to use 
investment to shape firm behaviour in the interests of workers and local unions is a limited and 
contradictory project. The argument is sustained through a discussion of the historical formation 
and institutional practices of the Solidarity Fund. The presence of large union-controlled 
investment funds offers local firms an alternative source of capital investment, protecting small 
and medium-sized firms from more aggressive financial actors. However, our main results show 
persistent tensions and contradictions between the Fund’s social goals and financial logics, as 
well as unintended effects on workplace union practices and power.  
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Managing Workers’ Capital? Limits and Contradictions of Labour Investment 
Funds 
Labour movements in North America having been debating whether to take an active role 
in the investment decisions of collectively bargained pension funds since at least the 1970s, when 
unions began to assert more control over jointly-managed pension boards.1 The question remains 
a salient one as public-sector pension funds in particular have grown in size and sophistication to 
become major actors in the restructuring of global capitalism, even as pension coverage continues 
to slide in the private sector and, more recently, in the public sector as well. As pensions became 
deregulated and invested in the booming stock markets of the late 1980s and 1990s, capital gains 
have at times exceeded contributions from plan beneficiaries and sponsors as pension funds have 
taken on the characteristics of investment banks or mutual funds seeking higher rates of return 
through riskier financial strategies (Archer, 2011). It was in this context of pension fund de-
regulation and financialization that union-bargained funds came to be thought of as ‘workers’ 
capital’ – with the implication that this capital ought to be managed in a way that is at least 
consistent with the interests of plan beneficiaries insofar as they are wage earners and members 
of working class communities (Fung, Hebb and Rogers, 2001; Carmichael and Quarter, 2003).  
It was not unreasonable in this context for trade unionists in the public sector especially to 
be concerned that union-bargained funds were being invested in ways that undermined 
employment quality and union bargaining power. This concern invites reflection on whether 
unionists should consider themselves responsible for the investment decisions of their pension 
funds and whether, through increased union control, workers’ savings could be invested in such a 
way as to counter financialization, and even used in strategic ways to extend union power and 
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improve working conditions. In short, can ‘workers’ capital’ be managed in ways that are 
consistent with union principles and building union power? 
The literature on ‘managing workers capital’ has suggested multiple ways by which union 
pension trustees might better align their fiduciary duty to plan beneficiaries, on the one hand, and 
the interests of workers, local communities and unions on the other. The most commonly 
discussed are social investment screens which deselect firms or sectors that do not meet labour, 
environmental or ethical standards, and shareholder activism, where labour shareholders vote on 
‘good corporate governance’ criteria that align with shareholder interests at annual meetings 
(Clark and Hebb, 2004; Bauer, Koedijk and Otten, 2005; Coiquaud and Morisette, 2010). 
Another, more likely avenue would have union trustees use their influence over pension fund 
governance to shift capital markets away from purely speculative activities, such as leveraged 
buyouts that shed labour and undermine employment quality (Baker and Fung, 2001; Applebaum 
and Batt, 2014) or short term asset trading that bears little or no relationship to the real economy 
and employment creation. A more solidaristic avenue for managing workers’ capital would have 
union-controlled funds used to leverage union power in the workplace by directing investment to 
unionized firms or heavily unionized sectors to sustain union labour markets, to protect union 
employment in cases of restructuring or to promote reindustrialization (Rifkin and Barber, 1978; 
Croce et al., 2011; McCarthy, 2017).  
The ‘workers’ capital’ perspective has argued that the limits to such strategies arise from 
shared control of pension funds, lack of knowledge and strategic direction given to union trustees 
(Weststar and Verma, 2007) and external rules imposed by the state, either through anti-union 
legislation (McCarthy, 2017) or unduly narrow interpretations of fiduciary duty found in Anglo-
American common law (Wessel, 1986; Webber, 2014). We do not dispute these limits. Union 
agency in the field of investment is constrained by externally-imposed institutions. However, 
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institutionalist and actor-centered approaches to the ‘workers capital’ debate are overly optimistic 
about the potential of union interventions in the realm of finance, we argue, as a result of their 
failure to consider a more fundamental contradiction between union power, on the one hand, and 
the nature of capital, on the other, that necessarily accompanies labour’s investment in capitalist 
firms. Investment funds, regardless of ownership or internal practices, must submit to the 
imperative to accumulate on the basis of profits extracted, ultimately, through control over a 
production process that is based on conflictual relations between firm owners and wage earners. 
Local unions contest this control and attempt to shift the distribution of firm revenues to their 
members. They do this by strengthening internal solidarity, contesting managerial discourse and 
promoting an independent framing, and developing broader alliances with communities and other 
unions (Lévesque and Murray, 2010). That there has been very little discussion of the relevance 
of this contradiction in the ‘workers capital’ debate is partly owing to the implicit theorization of 
capital as a resource rather than as a social relation of production. It is also the case that there are 
very few empirical examples of labour investment funds where contradictory roles – and not 
externally imposed institutional limits or weak strategic direction – represent the most salient 
restraint on using workers’ savings to extend union power or improve working conditions.  
This paper brings the contradictory nature of labour-controlled investment to the fore 
through a case study of Quebec’s Solidarity Fund (FSFTQ). The Fund was sponsored and is still 
effectively controlled by the Fédération des Travailleurs et Travailleuses du Québec (FTQ), the 
Province’s largest union federation with 35 national and international affiliated unions 
representing over 600,000 workers in the both private and public sectors.2 The founding 
legislation mandates the Fund with both a financial and a broad social mission. Fund investments 
must favour the protection and creation of employment in Quebec, promote the economic 
development of disadvantaged regions, advance workers’ retirement security, and foster 
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“economic knowledge among the workforce”, all the while ensuring a reasonable rate of return.3 
The Fund is given wide latitude in terms of how to accomplish these goals and benefits from 
generous tax incentives. With total assets of $13.7 billion, including $8 billion under active 
investment in Quebec enterprises, the Solidarity Fund represents the largest source of venture 
capital in Quebec (Fonds FTQ, 2017). To our knowledge, no other labour movement in the world 
has established such a degree of control over workers’ savings and taken such a large share of the 
venture capital market in its jurisdiction.  
The Solidarity Fund is unique in ways that make it a useful case from which to think 
about the limits and contradictions of managing workers’ capital. While some external limits are 
imposed, the Solidarity Fund is least burdened by the legal constraints that prevent union trustees 
in other contexts from using workers’ savings to improve the quality of employment and leverage 
union power. The Solidarity Fund is not constrained by employer preferences on jointly-managed 
pension boards and so the issue of shared control is removed as limit on labour fund investment 
decision making. The Fund differs from other experiments in “shared capitalism” (Kruse, Blasi 
and Park, 2010; Carberry, 2011) and Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIFs) in English 
Canada, in that Solidarity Fund investments are made by workers’ representatives, and 
investments are accompanied by representation on the board of the firm.4 Further, the Fund is less 
constrained to maximize profit. Fund managers do not seek to maximize profits above all else – a 
‘decent’ return will do. Given the substantial public subsidy involved, the Fund is in any case 
under much less pressure in this respect. Finally, the Fund acknowledges the contradictory nature 
of ‘managing workers’ capital’ in the institutional practices that have been developed to manage 
these contradictions. The founders of the Fund and current management, as trade unionists, do 
not deny that there is a basic conflict between the interests of wage earners and profit-seeking 
shareholders. On the contrary, the Fund was designed to manage these contradictions as much as 
	 5	
possible in the interests of workers, and a great deal of thought has gone into the question of what 
impact Fund investment will have on firm employees and local unions. If unions could use 
workers’ savings strategically to improve working conditions and counter financialization, we 
would expect the Solidarity Fund to be a successful such case. 
In emphasizing how even this most likely case of labour-controlled capital is constrained 
to behave like capital, rather than succeeding in bending the rules of capital to the needs of 
workers and unions, this paper casts some doubt on whether increased control over pension funds 
could serve the purposes of the labour movement. There have been few if any attempts to 
understand the internal practices of labour-investors and the Solidarity Fund in particular. Too 
often institutional practices which are presented as achieving ‘social’ or union goals are taken at 
face value, rather than seeking to understand how they were developed in response to the limits 
and contradictions of investment as a union tool. We begin with a critical review of the 
‘managing workers’ capital’ perspective, outlining where we see the limits and contradictions of 
this project, focusing on three approaches outlined above. We then turn to a historical account of 
the formation of the Solidarity Fund, situating the project in the highly constrained context of the 
capitalist crisis of the late 1970s/early 1980s and Quebec labour’s accommodationist response to 
the neoliberal turn. This historical account makes clear that institutional innovations that have 
been interpreted as extending union control over firms and capital markets were on the contrary 
developed to keep union and financial logics as separate as possible. A third section discusses the 
Fund’s investment decision-making process and questions how, concretely, affiliated unions and 
worker shareholders impose union and social rules on firms through this process. Our discussion 
of the institutional practices of the Solidarity Fund reveals their limited purchase on firm 
governance. Rather than extending union control over investment, these institutional practices 
were developed to manage the contradictions and liabilities of labour-controlled investment as we 
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have theorized them in this paper and as the founders of the Solidarity Fund themselves 
understood them. The conflictual cases of Fund investment we refer to in this section are not 
intended to be representative of relations between the Fund and local unions and workers. Rather, 
in revealing latent sources of tension between two separate projets – local union power and 
union-controlled investment – they exemplify the limits and contradictions highlighted by our 
theoretical approach to ‘managing workers capital’ more generally. We conclude by drawing the 
implications of this case for debates on union control over pension funds.  
The research is based on three sources. We were afforded privileged access to key 
informants, including the surviving founders of the Fund (2), current Fund staff, including 
directorships (3), former staff (1), and staff of affiliated unions who have engaged with Fund 
strategy and governance (2). Our Semi-directed interviews (N=8) lasting an average of 2 hours 
were conducted in 2016 and early 2017 and fully transcribed. These sources are not without their 
limitations. Although our interview subjects were frank in acknowledging the challenges and 
limits of their project, the interview strategy we employed has given us a view from the top and 
from the inside. However, given the nature of their work in managing the project on a daily basis, 
these sources provide a much more sober evaluation of the limits and contradictions of managing 
workers’ capital than is found in much of the literature. We have also relied on publicly available 
data on the structure, operations and financial returns of the Fund as reported in the annual 
financial statements as well as grey literature produced by the Fund and by third parties. 
Interview material was cross-referenced in research conducted at the Solidarity Fund archives in 
the fall of 2017, including official policies of the FTQ, Congress reports, and the union 
federation’ newspaper, Le monde ouvrier.  
 
1. Managing Workers Capital 
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Three approaches to managing workers capital can be identified through which union-
controlled funds could conceivably have a positive impact on firm-level labour relations and 
union power: empowering shareholders to be more engaged in corporate governance in a 
‘socially responsible’ way; a passive investment strategy which provides ‘patient capital’ to 
firms, providing the credit required to hire workers to produce goods and services in the real 
economy; and a more active strategy in which ownership stakes are used to sustain collective 
bargaining or promote better employment practices by changing firm behaviour. The Solidarity 
Fund stakes its claim to be an alternative, pro-worker investment vehicle on the grounds that it 
favours the latter two approaches.  
The limits and contradictions of the first approach should not detain us.5 Given that 
pension funds in general (let alone funds partly controlled by worker representatives) nearly 
always represent a minority of total company stock, and a small percentage of financial assets in 
the economy as a whole, shareholder activism as a means of improving the quality of work and 
labour relations is logically limited to cases where the interests between a firm’s workforce and 
shareholders align, and shareholders are able to impose these interests on management. Even if 
costs associated with raised labour standards may be offset by lower reputational risk 
(Ghiralducci et al., 1997; Hebb, 2001; Carmichael, 2005), evidence that financial markets 
undervalue unionized firms (Abowd, 1989) and that unions reduce financial returns to 
shareholders (Becker and Olson, 1989) would suggest that any alignment between labour and 
shareholders could only be marginal and fortuitous. Unions are perceived by finance as 
competing for rents to be extracted from the firm and it is partly for this reason that the rise of 
finance has been associated with the decline of organized labour (Peters, 2011). ‘Shareholder 
engagement’ and ‘good corporate governance’, promoted in large part by pension funds in 
alliance with other institutional investors with a view to maximising profit and minimizing 
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investor risk, is associated with lower employment standards and weaker labour power resources 
(Applebaum, Batt and Clark, 2013; Applebaum and Batt, 2014).  
Moreover, this approach sits uncomfortably with basic principles of trade unionism – 
shareholder activism is legitimated on the grounds that businesses are run in the interests of 
shareholders, and measures to enhance shareholder engagement are used in turn to legitimize the 
claims of shareholders to firm profits against those of workers (Stanford, 1999; Marens, 2004; 
Soederberg, 2009; Talbot, 2013). Relying on shareholder conventions and norms to regulate 
employment runs counter to organized labour’s longstanding opposition to shareholder ideology 
and support for state regulation of financial markets (Jacoby, 2008).  
The second approach – directing workers savings to long-term investments in the form of 
private equity or debt of non-financial firms – would seem to counter pressure from capital 
markets on firm management to maximize short term profits at the expense of secure 
employment or other social criteria. Comparative political economy has put great store in the 
complementarity of bank-based financial systems to higher levels of employment protection, 
employer autonomy, employee skill development and even local union power (Estevez-Abe, 
Iverson and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The interest in counterposing ‘patient’ to 
‘impatient’ capital arises from a concern that, with the decline of bank-based lending, 
institutional investors are systematically able to exert pressure on firm governance as a function 
of investment time horizon, and that this pressure, or lack of financial commitment, undermines 
the long term planning and the sharing of risk (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Auvray et al., 
2016).6  
Often given normative connotations, the implications of patient capital for the quality of 
employment and labour relations would appear to be highly contingent on who controls the 
capital and what strategies they pursue (Naczyk, 2016). Union trustees might prefer to align their 
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interests with industrial capital and commit capital to firms prepared to make long term 
investments in plant and the local workforce, or to make investment decisions based on an 
interest that plan beneficiaries may have in the viability of an economic sector or region (ibid.). If 
the interests of plan beneficiaries are understood to include maintaining area employment levels, 
then fiduciary duty might pose a less relevant limit on union trustees inclined to eschew profit 
maximisation in favour of local economic development (Webber, 2014).  
Although this approach to managing workers capital comes closer than the first in 
directing resources to the real economy, and therefore is more likely to be associated with 
positive employment outcomes, patient capital strategies are ambiguously related to 
financialization. Patience has been used to rationalize profit against socialist critique since at least 
J.S. Mill’s Principles of Political Economy (1848) and Frédéric Bastiat’s Economic Harmonies 
(1850) and it is not incidental that Patience should be one of the Victorian virtues to re-emerge in 
the discourse of financial actors in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, this focus 
on difference in the time horizon of varieties of financial capital continues to center financial 
actors as drivers of financialization when this may overstate the case. Knafo and Dutta (2016) 
trace the financialization of the firm to managerial innovations within the large conglomerates of 
the 1960s, rather than pressures emanating from financial markets, while it remains the case that 
most corporate investment is financed internally through retained earnings rather than through 
issuance of debt or new shares (Stanford, 1999).  
For union pension trustees, patient capital investment has the potential of triggering a 
series of political liabilities for public sector unions in particular, as their pension funds seek out 
long term value orientations in private equity funds, real estate, and privatized state assets in the 
form of private-public partnerships (P3s) against which they have strongly campaigned (Calvert, 
2005; Archer, 2011). Expanding private ownership models in public infrastructure, promoted by 
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the financial industry with pension funds in the lead, is consistent with a deepening of 
financialization in the sense that new circuits of capital are being opened up in the public sector, 
including in heavily unionized health care, education and municipal services, where profits are to 
be made through outsourcing and non-union service delivery. Such patient capital strategies 
would be associated with worse rather than better work. More generally, making fine distinctions 
between patient and impatient capital implies taking a political position in favour of one type of 
asset class over another when the issue is the empowerment of financial capital as a whole.  
The third and most promising approach would have union-directed investment used in a 
much more interventionist way to leverage union power by influencing firm decision making, the 
organization of the labour process and labour relations, and in supporting unionized firms or 
sectors that are highly unionized (Coiquaud and Morissette, 2010; Webber, 2018). In this vein, 
unions may use the board representation that ownership affords to block anti-union practices or 
smooth accreditation, or to pass on proprietary information to workers and bargaining 
committees. The latter course of action would empower workers by giving them a clearer picture 
of firm finances, and give local unions a firmer basis from which to offer alternative restructuring 
plans that privilege maintaining employment levels and bargaining relationships, with financing 
provided by labour’s investment arm. This was the rationale behind the argument for using 
labour-investment funds to reindustrialize the US rustbelt in the late 1970s (Rifkin and Barber, 
1978). There is a long history in the United States of the building trades and Teamsters using 
multi-employer pension funds to sustain employment growth in unionized firms, before Taft-
Hartley and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 made such practices more 
difficult if not impossible (Barber, 1982; McCarthy, 2014, 2017). McCarthy presents the 
Solidarity Fund as a counter-factual of a more solidaristic path to managing capital, a case of 
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what might have been if political developments in the United States had not foreclosed the 
possibility (McCarthy, 2017: 121-124).  
The managing workers’ capital literature often assumes that union representation on the 
board of firms implies an intrusion of union or ‘social’ logics into capitalist logics. The reverse of 
the medal – the intrusion of market logics on union practice as unions take responsibility for firm 
profitability and survival – is rarely theorized or even recognized. It was precisely this refusal to 
take on management responsibilities that, until the late 1970s at least, explains why North 
American labour leaderships wanted no part in the investment decision making of union pension 
funds. “We would end up bargaining with ourselves, and we’d be forced to decide between our 
role as representatives of workers and representatives of owners” (cited in Barber, 1982: 42). The 
same dilemma challenges those who see the Solidarity Fund as a promising breach in capitalist 
control of investment. In his discussion of the Solidarity Fund as a case of “social capitalism as a 
pathway of social empowerment,” Wright (2016: 161) nevertheless recognizes that the Fund’s 
“investment strategy is to strengthen the competitiveness of firms within the Quebec economy, 
not to weaken Quebec capitalism, and to foster more collaborative relations between employers 
and workers through financial education and other devices, not to increase class antagonism” 
(Ibid). While we agree with his characterization of the Fund’s investment strategy, Wright is 
begging the question of how a project of strengthening capitalism and firm-level competitiveness 
through partnership unionism is consistent with social empowerment over capital.  
Neither union-controlled investment funds nor the firms in which they invest are exempt 
from the disciplines that market competition imposes on all actors under capitalism. If labour-
controlled investment funds are to maintain their share of the capital market, investments must 
return a rate of profit that is sufficient to reproduce the fund on an expanded scale. The firms in 
which the fund invests must earn a rate of profit sufficient to cover these returns as for any other 
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investor. The average profit rate is socially-determined in the sense that it is externally imposed 
on individual firms through a competitive process by which more productive firms ‘regulate’ 
their competitors, forcing them to increase their own productivity on pain on being forced from 
the market. Employment levels, wages and work organization are all heavily determined by this 
need to organize the production process in such a way as to ensure an average rate of profit. It is 
this external competitive pressure which imposes on union-controlled capital the imperatives of 
capital, rather than the needs of workers.  
Any number of social or pro-union practices can be demanded of firms in exchange for 
investment, but in competitive capital markets, firms are under no obligation to accept these 
terms. Any such imposition on the firm has either to be offset by a lower profit expectation or 
some other advantage. To the extent that union-controlled funds benefit from higher quality firm-
level information relative to other institutional investors (assuming they consult with workers 
before making an investment) they may be able to offer preferential terms that would overcome 
some of the liabilities, from a business perspective, of inviting a labour investor on to the board. 
Firms may in turn derive benefits from higher trust workplace relations if labour not only 
provides patient capital, but is furthermore engaged in organizing the collaboration of workers in 
high-performance practices that may be unworkable in low-trust workplaces dominated by 
financial market pressures. Laliberté (1997: 47) has mounted a defense of the public subsidies the 
Solidarity Fund receives on these grounds, that labour-investors allow small and medium-sized 
firms to overcome agency problems in the workplace and on capital markets. But this assumes 
that the Fund will encourage a partnership- and competitiveness-oriented unionism at the local 
workplace level, foregrounding again the needs of capital.  
Firms facing bankruptcy may have little choice but to accept labour-controlled investment 
with various rules attached. If labour funds invest in such firms to protect employment and union 
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recognition, they are nevertheless committed to participating in a restructuring process that is 
likely to involve concessions on wages and work rules. This outcome might be judged preferable 
to unemployment or union suppression, but it does involve a union-controlled institution 
impressing on workers the imperative of market competition and sacrifice. Firm owners may 
even welcome labour investors in such cases if this promises to smooth the acceptance of 
concessions on work rules, wages and retiree benefits.7 Rescuing bankrupt firms implies lower 
profits and higher risks. If labour-controlled investors are to maintain average returns, they must 
also invest in less risky, more profitable firms and sectors, regardless of employment or social 
considerations.  
The same dilemma confronts attempts to use labour funds to defend employment in areas 
that have been abandoned by capital. Fixing capital in such areas has been interpreted in the 
literature as giving workers tools to counter deindustrialization and even the uneven development 
of capitalism (Lincoln, 2000). Again, labour-controlled investors must find themselves pulled in 
both directions, fixing capital in declining regions to meet social mandates while seeking out 
higher profit investments in dynamic sectors and more productive firms, heightening uneven 
development even as they take responsibility for the social and employment implications of this. 
The contradictions identified above are all attenuated if labour-controled capital is 
subsidized by the state. Subsidized funds can grow and maintain market share with below 
average returns, freeing the fund to priviledge more ‘social’ or union-oriented criteria. But this 
only raises a further dilemma for labour, that of undermining the tax base to promote private 
capital accumulation (Gindin, 1988), and in becoming dependent on continued government 
support.8 
 
2. Managing capitalist crisis: the FTQ and the quest for full employment 
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 The notion of launching a Solidarity Fund was selected from a variety of possible labour 
responses to a deep economic crisis that shook Canada and Quebec particularly hard in the early 
1980s. The Fund was intended as a response to this crisis in a period of political realignment 
within the labour movement. Throughout the 1970s, FTQ-affiliated unions in heavy industry and 
manufacturing had been calling on the labour central to do something about plant closures and 
mass layoffs (Le monde ouvrier, December 1983). The research department would intervene on a 
case-by-case basis but with few means at their disposal and nearly no influence on government 
policy and so to limited effect (interview subject #3). With the election of the labour-backed 
social-democratic Parti Québécois (PQ) to power in 1976, a more corporatist approach to the 
employment crisis presented itself in the context of a series of ‘socio-economic summits’ that 
were convened between government, business and labour – the latter two henceforth referred to 
as ‘socio-economic partners.’ It was during the 1982 summit that, at the behest of the FTQ, the 
government launched a tri-partite housing development corporation (Corvée Habitation) intended 
to restart the residential housing sector with tax-subsidized financing from different levels of 
government, the banks and construction workers themselves. This was the model that the labour 
central wanted to scale-up and apply across the industrial economy: bring down the cost of 
capital in defined sectors with tax-incentivized retirement savings and thereby restart private 
investment and employment growth, all under a tri-partite governance structure (interview 
subject #3). 
 Some of the largest FTQ affiliates at the time belonged to US-based Internationals. 
Members assisting annual International union conferences were well aware of the crisis besetting 
the US rustbelt and were open to solutions proposed by their US brothers and sisters. For 
instance, the Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP) model, increasingly popular in both 
unionized and non-unionized firms in the US, was considered but ultimately rejected on the 
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grounds that workers should not risk investing their retirement savings in their place of 
employment in a period of rapid industrial restructuring. Universally committed to social 
democracy, the Quebec labour movement looked to Sweden for inspiration in policy innovation, 
and at the end of the 1970s the FTQ sent a delegation to study the Meidner wage earner funds (Le 
monde ouvrier, June 1979) – a much more assertive labour strategy to socialize capital ownership 
that proved beyond the reach even of the Swedish unions and was considered impractical in 
Quebec given its liberal political culture, and the much weaker position of organized labour 
within the state.9 Finally, business balked at a tri-partite fund for re-industrialization. The FTQ 
went so far as to propose agreeing to the government’s planned 20 percent across the board 
public sector wage cuts if the savings were rolled into such a fund (interview subject #3). This 
too was refused. Ultimately the FTQ went ahead with its own fund, based on voluntary tax-
incentivized contributions from workers. The central had wanted contributions to be levied at 
source from workers’ pay packets, as with automatic union dues, but this was abandoned at the 
last hour over Liberal party opposition.  
 In this exercise in “pure innovation” (interview subject #3), the labour movement could 
nevertheless draw on a culture of social entrepreneurship and cooperative finance rooted in the 
francophone Québécois small business community. The FTQ relied heavily on this milieu for 
expertise in starting up the fund, including assistance from a government agency concerned with 
promoting the cooperative economy (Société de development des coopératives – SDC). 
Implicitly, PQ political support for the Solidarity Fund was conditioned both by the party’s 
concern to disentangle the provincial economy from Anglo-dominated finance, and by its need to 
incorporate a section of the labour movement in a context of austerity and a high level of class 
conflict. From the perspective of the union leadership, the Fund was always presented as a tool in 
the broader struggle for full employment, full employment being understood as the basis from 
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which organized labour would be able to advance its longer-term goal of democratizing the 
economy (Le monde ouvrier, January 1984). There was no intention of using the Fund itself as a 
tool for the democratization of the workplace and the Solidarity Fund is not suited to this end 
(Morin, 2012). The intention, hardly less ambitious, was to take “collective responsibility for the 
employment problem” (Caron, n.d.), in response to the immediate demands of affiliated unions to 
save the furniture from the fire, and in assuming this responsibility regain a certain rapport de 
force with employers through traditional trade unionism. “If the capitalists don’t want to put their 
money to work, then we will substitute for them” (interview subject #4). The proposal to launch 
the Fund was formally adopted by the FTQ’s 1983 annual congress, along with demands on the 
state to ensure full employment, measures to promote pay equity, and work time reduction with 
no loss of pay (FTQ’s Congress Report, 1983; FTQ’s Policy Statement, 1983).  
  The decision to go ahead with an investment fund was a contentious one within the FTQ 
and was condemned by the rival union central to its left, the CSN (Confédération des syndicats 
nationaux). The most effective support within the FTQ came from the United Steelworkers and 
the building trades, powerful affiliates that had been the most affected by plant closures and 
unemployment. Opposition was rooted in the public sector unions, the Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, as well as the organized left, which was strongly placed at the staff level within the 
FTQ (interview subject #4, #7). The left-right political distinction was not around full 
employment as the correct goal, but rather whether this was to be the sole responsibility of the 
state or whether the ‘socio-economic partners’ would share in this responsibility. Opponents 
argued from the congress floor that the project represented a break with class-struggle unionism 
and would place the FTQ in contradictory positions, both in the workplace vis-à-vis local unions, 
and at the political level, given the federations positions against tax-based subsidies to private 
capital.10    
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 Adopted by 80  percent of congress participants (Le monde ouvrier, December 1983), the 
decision of the FTQ to go forward with an investment fund was a defeat for the left as it signalled 
a reversal of FTQ positions on this question and an acceptance of the new ‘partnership’ approach 
both at the political level and within the workplace (Gill, 1985; Piotte, 1998). Concern for 
maintaining employment came to trump improving wages and working conditions. A labour 
central that had formally adopted ten years previously a programme that heavily criticized public 
subsidies to private enterprise as a failed solution to unemployment, and that had called for a 
collective pooling of savings by the state to gain public control over the province’s resource base, 
was now asking to become a partner with private enterprise with publicly-subsidized capital.11  
 
3. Investment strategy and social innovation 
 The leadership of the FTQ has been at pains since the origins of the project to insist that 
the Fund would not just subsidize employment but would invest in profitable, growing 
enterprises with a view to making a profit.12 When the project was launched, investment 
opportunities arose as local unions pleaded with the employer to seek Fund financing as an 
alternative to mass layoffs or closing shop. In the course of the 1980s, the Fund began to shed its 
reputation among business owners as a union tool and employment rescue operation (interview 
subject #3). Currently, the Fund is much more likely to receive investment requests from business 
owners and the Fund partners with other private equity investors and governmental development 
agencies in large industrial and infrastructure projects, a more ‘proactive’ approach that is forced 
on the Fund if it wishes to accumulate at the same rate as its competition. As the Fund has drifted 
from its original role and finds itself collaborating and competing with other investment funds, 
the question of what differentiates the fund as an employment creation tool and union vehicle is 
all the more relevant. There are three innovations in particular that merit discussion: the network 
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of workplace representatives (réseau des responsables locaux, or RLs), the social audit (bilan 
social), and economic training (formation économique). We evaluate the Fund’s investment 
practices insofar as they differ from less patient and anti-union forms of capital; the capacity of 
union members to direct investment decision-making through the RL network; and the social 
audit and economic training functions that accompany Fund investments.  
Investment strategy 
 The principal goal of the Solidarity Fund remains employment creation. Since any 
investment in the real economy, including that of private institutional investors, banks or large 
corporations, can be said to create employment, there is little point in quantifying the number of 
jobs created by Solidarity Fund investments, and the Fund’s annual reports have ceased to 
produce such figures. Investment is not the only factor that determines employment growth and it 
would be misleading to credit the Solidarity Fund with employment creation in private firms.  
 On the positive side of the ledger, there is little doubt that the Solidarity Fund, at least 
insofar as its active capital portfolio is concerned, meets the criteria of patient capital. The 
average investment horizon is 7 years, although the Fund does not maintain a policy on the 
matter. In cases of firm financial difficulty, the Fund will retain its investment and take an active 
role in workplace restructuring with a view to maintaining employment security, even if this 
means taking a hard line on wage demands. It disinvests when a window of opportunity presents 
itself – another buyer is interested, the firm goes public or is bought back by the owner. Before 
selling an ownership stake the Fund has an ‘exit social audit’ produced to ensure that 
disinvestment will not cause employment loss (interview subject #6). Less than 10 percent of its 
active capital assets are rolled over annually on average. This lower level of investment turnover 
implies a lower profit rate than competing venture capital firms and a smaller number of annual 
investments than it otherwise might make if the Fund pursued a profit maximising strategy.13  
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 The Fund does not exit in cases of poor short-term performance. Unlike private equity 
firms, the Solidarity Fund does not, with very rare exceptions, take majority positions in firms. 
Again, this is done to avoid situations in which the Fund would be expected to govern the 
enterprise in the interests of the workers or local union, if present (interview # 3).14 Minority 
positions allow the Fund to take a pasive role in firm governance. The Fund is represented on 
firm boards by a lone accountant who meets with Fund staff in regular meetings and with union 
representatives as needed. To the very limited extent that the Fund exercises voice in firm 
governance, this is done not so much to increase financial return but to increase productivity and 
cooperative workplace relations, as discussed below through its ‘social’ innovations, all in the 
interests of maintaining employment. A reliance on economic training lessens recourse to 
external consultants which are likely to be anti-union and the Fund will rely on its extensive 
network in Quebec’s SME sector to encourage its ‘partner firms’ to source from local suppliers 
and skilled labour (interview subject #6).  
 Although figures are difficult to arrive at, it is estimated that Solidarity Fund capital costs 
slightly more – generally 3 to 5 percent more – than the competition (interview subject #5). 
Solidarity Fund representatives make the argument to business owners that their contribution to 
cooperative workplace relations, through the economic training sessions, as well as the extensive 
knowledge they have built up on Quebec’s leading economic sectors, makes this cost worth 
paying (interview subject #6). Profit expectations, which vary by sector and risk level, are in the 
15 - 17 percent range (interview subject #5). At the same time, the Fund will invest in projects 
that offer a much lower profit expectation than private and even governmental agencies will 
accept, if there is a compelling social rationale to do so, and their patient capital orientation, 
including a concern to maintain employment levels, implies a lower rate on a number of 
investments. The Fund has earned an annual return of 6,8 percent over a five year period ending 
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in 2016. For the purposes of comparison, Desjardins Capital, a leading competitor in Quebec’s 
venture capital market, earned 3,8 percent.15 
 The Solidarity Fund is less reliant on financial return for asset accumulation for two 
specific reasons. Most importantly, generous tax incentives, over and above other Registered 
Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP)-eligible funds, ensure a high subscription rate.16 Beyond the 
tax-reduction incentive, workers are approached at work by their colleagues to contribute into the 
Fund for financial, retirement planning reasons and to support the local economy. The RLs are 
the only non-financial professionals allowed under law to do so. One implication for the capital 
market is that the Solidarity Fund can grow while underbidding its competitors and depress PE 
profit rates across the industry.17 
On the negative side of the ledger, pressures on the Fund to meet profit expectations push 
it to make ‘patient’ capital investments that do not meet ‘social’ criteria or even contradict union 
positions. Two recent Fund investment projects are noteworthy. The first concerns a proposed 
$400 million fund devoted to ‘socio-infrastructures’ – i.e. libraries, schools and community 
centers – on a private ownership model closely resembling private-public partnerships against 
which the Quebec section of the Canadian Union of Public Employees has strongly campaigned. 
The second concerns an investment in a Quebec corporation, Pangea, whose business model 
involves buying up agricultural land and leasing it back to tenant farmers (interview subject #6; 
Le Devoir, April 21 2017). Neither project is motivated by advancing any social or union goal. 
P3s and land grabbing are long-term, high profit investments favoured by large pension funds in 
the context of low market returns and declining investment opportunities in the real economy.  
Retaining minority ownership positions protects the Fund from the expectations of 
workers and local unions that the Fund use its investments to intervene in firm governance to the 
benefit of local unions and workers. This rule does not protect the FTQ from damages to its 
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reputation that may result from anti-union practices of its Fund’s partner firms. The passive 
nature of Fund investment frees partner firms to consistently favour profit- and growth-oriented 
business strategies. The Fund does not oppose firms going public, for instance, and encourages 
internationalization (interview subject #3) even if this dilutes any informal pro-labour influence 
the Fund may exert as partner firms become integrated into global finance and production 
networks. The dilemmas here were most publicly exposed by the Fund’s investment in Montreal-
based Gildan Activewear. The Fund had nurtured Gildan, a small Quebec textile firm, with a 
series of loans beginning in 1996 that allowed the company to relaunch as Gildan Activewear 
after having failed to raise funds from the big banks, which considered the project too risky 
(Batellier and Raufflet, 2007). The firm opened its first plant in Honduras in 1998 and went 
public on the Toronto (TSX) and New York (NYSE) exchanges that year. In 2002, now one of 
the largest producers of branded cotton t-shirts in North America, the company fired 38 workers 
for union activity at its El Progreso Honduras plant (Bérubé, 2003). After a media exposé, the 
Fund came under intense pressure to sell its highly profitable 11% stake in the company, which it 
proposed to do over a period of 24 months so as not to disrupt the share price (ibid.). The Fund 
finally finally divested its ownership of Gildan shares four years later, after they trippled in value 
from $18.16 to $60.99 on the TSX (Tison, 2007). That year Gildan closed its last two remaining 
plants in Quebec and transferred the entirety of its production to plants in Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Haiti (Desrosiers, 2007).  
 
 
Union control – the RL network 
 Fund investment decisions are authorized by an executive board comprised of affiliated 
union representatives and independent members, currently in a majority, voted by Fund 
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shareowners. Individual files are negotiated by investment professionals who are hired out of 
business schools and the banking industry. These latter have no particular commitment to the 
labour movement, are career motivated to make profitable investments and are liable to see the 
social and union commitments as fetters on their ability to close deals (“the only problem with 
the Fonds FTQ is the three letters after its name” is a running joke in the office, interview #1). 
Fund managing directors, who do have union backgrounds, speak of having to use two sides of 
their brains simultaneously, the ‘union’ side and the ‘financial’ side.  
 The RL network is composed of volunteer representatives in unionized workplaces at a 
ratio of 1 non-staff rep for every 50 workers. The primary task of the RLs is to sell subscriptions 
to the Fund. The RL network was put in place out of necessity, that of convincing union members 
one on one to invest in the Fund in the absence of a collective vote for automatic pay check 
deductions. A virtue was made of this necessity as the RL network became the primary means by 
which rank-and-file trade unionists and union affiliates shape Fund investment policy – the RLs 
represent the “skeletal framework (l’ossature)” of the Fund and the founders credit this network 
with ensuring the success of the project and ensuring also that what would otherwise be a strictly 
financial instrument remains under the control of the labour movement (interview subject #3, #4). 
With 1,400 current members, the RLs represent the largest network of rank-and-file trade 
unionists within the FTQ. RLs volunteer out of commitment to union values and so these are 
‘shareholder activists’ in an oddly literal sense of the term. They are concerned with the use of 
the Fund as a union lever, rather than with financial return, let alone maximising financial return. 
 Approximately 60 percent of Fund shares are owned by trade unionists. In order to 
maintain effective union influence over the Fund – in particular, to ensure that trade union 
representatives occupy a majority on the board – the FTQ must maintain and mobilize this 
network. Since Fund governance decisions turn on an exceptionally low voting participation rate, 
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the mobilization of the RL network has been enough to ensure trade union control. The RLs are 
also convened at a local and regional level several times a year and receive paid work release for 
this purpose. These local and regional meetings are organized by Fund staff seconded from 
affiliated unions. Thus a link is established between the priorities and concerns of FTQ-affiliated 
unions and the Fund’s effective voting base. Conflicts between Fund investment decisions and 
union priorities are raised in these meetings and pressure is exerted on Fund directors to intercede 
with employers in cases of union-management conflict. This is done on occasion through back 
channels. 
 The RL network must be considered a blunt instrument, since the RLs are not in a 
position to direct funds in any strategic way. At best, they function as a veto on investments that 
run counter to union principles or interests. “If the Fund took a decision against the interests of 
workers or with which we didn’t agree, it would blow up quickly, very quickly” (interview 
subject #7).18 The RL network is the primary means by which the Fund raises subscriptions. They 
“control the taps” and the Fund must take care to maintain its reputation among trade unionists 
for this reason. In 2017, CUPE was able to mobilize labour shareholders against the Fund’s 
‘socio-infrastructure’ proposal at the FTQ’s annual congress. The motion was sent back to the 
Fund with requested revisions.  
The social audit 
 The social audit refers to a report that is produced after a workplace visit and which is 
subsequently sent along with the financial report to the executive level prior to an investment 
being made in a prospective firm. A representative of the Fund meets with the human resource 
director, the local union leadership, where relevant, and informal groups of workers in the 
absence of management. The representative consults the collective agreement and the grievance 
file, looks at the turnover rate, evaluates the health and safety record, compares salaries to the 
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industry and regional average, and compiles a demographic portrait of the workforce. As a part of 
this process, the Fund may in some cases put pressure on management and union leadership to sit 
down and resolve outstanding issues, especially grievances. The Fund will also prepare a list of 
recommendations to management and over a two to four week period work to improve workplace 
standards and practices, all prior to an investment decision being made. Arguments in favour of 
improving health and safety, communication and morale are couched in terms of productivity and 
economic performance so as to be more palatable to business owners. Fund representatives tread 
gingerly as they know that firm owners can very well get financing from less demanding sources. 
In some cases, the social audit establishes a benchmark for return visits (interview subject # 4, 
#5). If the industry average wage is $25/hr., the Fund will not invest in a company that is paying 
$12 (interview subject #6). Beyond these workplace-level considerations, the social audit 
considers whether an investment in a non-union firm will increase competitive pressures on a 
unionized firm (“We are not going to rob Peter to pay Paul”). The Fund does not have a policy of 
generally favouring a unionized over a non-unionized firm, or an FTQ-unionized firm over one 
organized by its rival.  
 The social audit was an afterthought. It was put in place to prevent the Fund from finding 
itself in an impossible situation where its reputation among both workers and businesses owners 
would suffer from an investment. There is also a financial risk interest in screening out certain 
firms for ‘social’ considerations, especially poor labour relations. The social audit represents one 
attempt at responding to the contradiction at the heart of the project: how can an investor be a 
partner in management while also being responsible to the labour movement? This contradiction 
emerged in one of the Fund’s first forays, an investment in a supplier to Texaco that had been 
recently unionized against the strong opposition of the owner. The owner expected the Fund to 
intervene in his favour, to reduce workplace conflict and discipline the union’s wage demands in 
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difficult first contract negotiations. The local union leadership expected the exact opposite of 
their Solidarity Fund and it was in this expectation that they had requested the investment (Caron, 
n.d.). From the Fund’s perspective, the problem was simply that the workers did not want to save 
their jobs and had little interest in partnering with management to improve matters. In avoiding 
contentious work sites, the social audit protects the Fund from finding itself called on to favour 
either workers or their business partners, either of which course of action would pose 
considerable risk to the reputation it wished to create, that of being neither a management tool nor 
a Trojan horse for labour (interview subject #4). If the grievance file is too long and if the 
workers themselves do not wish for the Fund to take an ownership position, the Fund does not 
invest. The social audit is intended to identify such cases. The financial report represents the 
Fund’s first ‘insurance policy’ against a bad investment. The social audit, along with the lines of 
communication this opens up between plant workers and the Fund, is a second insurance policy 
(interview subject #3).  
 The social audit does not of course ensure that firms respond to union principles or rules 
once an investment has been made. The Fund has at times found itself an investor in firms that 
are actively engaged in undermining union standards and employment. Perhaps the most 
aggravating such case was the lock-out and ultimate defeat of the Vidéotron cable workers in 
2002-2003, a major turning point in industrial relations in the province (Rouillard, 2004). 
Vidéotron management precipitated the conflict by demanding the right to outsource a portion of 
the work of the bargaining unit, represented by the FTQ-affiliated Canadian Union of Public 
Employees (CUPE). Vidéotron had purchased the unit with financing from the Caisse de 
placement et dépot (CPD), the province’s largest pension fund, with a view to promoting the 
Quebec-based company against Vidéotron’s larger, Toronto-based rival in the context of industry 
consolidation. Immediately following the lock-out and for the duration of the work stoppage, the 
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company maintained operations by outsourcing the work to Entourage, a small unionized firm 
that the Solidarity Fund had created in 1996 to save the jobs of cable workers at risk in a previous 
wave of outsourcing, but at wages below union scale. Essentially scabbing on the Vidéotron 
strike, low-cost Entourage allowed Vidéotron to whipsaw its unionized workforce, ultimately 
gaining more in concessions than what it would have saved in outsourcing.19 Neither a union 
ownership stake in Entourage nor union representation on the board of the CDP provided any 
leverage to the local workforce in this bruising fight.  
Economic training 
 As a rule, the Solidarity Fund does not intervene in firm-level labour relations. The local 
union leadership does not want the Fund to meddle in its defined area of responsibility for fear 
that it may undermine its authority, and the Fund does not wish to find itself at cross purposes 
between local labour leadership and its business partners. The most significant exception to this 
rule are Solidarity Fund-organized economic training sessions.  
 The Fund employs a team of 9-10 popular educators whose role is to give workers an 
understanding of basic accounting concepts and principles. This ensures that workers have the 
tools required for going over the company’s financial statements. These statements have been 
independently audited by the Fund and accountants responsible to both the firm and the Fund are 
present during these sessions as a check on the veracity of the information. In addition to this, the 
educator will convene groups of employees to discuss labour process issues at which workers are 
asked to give their input on how to achieve efficiencies in operations. The owner is invited at the 
end of the process to present the business plan. If requested, the Fund will animate workgroups 
formed by plant managers, workers and union representatives to resolve work organization-level 
conflicts (interview subject #6). Sessions are organized at the request usually of the human 
resources director or, more rarely, the local union. They take place normally over a 2 day period 
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and are organized both onsite and off. Since 1989, tens of thousands of workers in Quebec have 
gone through these training sessions.  
 The reference to economic training was inserted in the Fund’s enabling legislation to give 
it a more ‘social’ profile, beyond its role in simply saving or generating employment, and thus 
ease its acceptance within the ranks of the FTQ (interview subject #4). As with the social audit, 
the much more significant workplace education sessions emerged as a means of managing the 
liabilities inherent to the Fund’s contradictory position between local labour and firm ownership, 
although founders were also inspired by the possibility of “raising the consciousness level” and 
transferring information to workers in order to empower them (ibid.).   
 The education sessions studiously avoid labour relations. But access to the books and the 
discussions that arise from this information cannot but have an impact on the bargaining process. 
“The first thing that workers do once the financial information has been verified, once the 
training has been done, is they figure out what impact their salary demands will have on the gross 
profit rate (interview subject #4).” This takes a lot of the art and politics – not to mention time – 
out of the bargaining process, and this was not appreciated by local labour leadership. Indeed, 
resistance to institutionalizing the training and open book sessions came from the union side, not 
from management.  
 Discussions around labour process and other operational questions also arise naturally 
from being granted access to the books. Workers themselves are not naïve about these sessions. 
Solidarity Fund educators report that they are perceived at worksites as representing a 
shareholder interest, not a union one (interview subject #1). They see the cost of materials and 
energy inputs and are motivated to find ways of reducing these to free up value for their wage 
demands. “People began to understand that a part of their power in the plant was, if the rules 
were well established, that they could create value in better controlling their work environment” 
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(interview subject #4). This can have a salutary effect, from an upper management or ownership 
perspective, on profits as well as work culture (line managers chafe at these sessions because 
their rules and practices are often found at fault by workers for undermining efficiency). These 
perhaps unintended effects of the training sessions on profit rates and partnership-oriented work 
culture explain their “explosive” success within the business community (Ibid). The Fund is 
regularly approached by business owners to conduct economic training sessions even in the 
absence of the Fund considering an ownership stake. It remains a significant part of the ‘value-
added’ that the Solidarity Fund uses to distinguish itself from its rivals on the province’s capital 
market (interview subject #6). The training sessions used to be offered free of charge, but a fee 
for service model was introduced in 2013 as a result of pressure to bring the cost of Fund capital 
in line with its competitors (interview subject #1).   
 The ‘social’ dimension to the Fund should not be counterposed to the financial or simply 
coded as efforts to extend union control over capital. As we have seen, these three social 
innovations also serve a clearly defined financial interest, both in controlling for risk and through 
their economic performance effects on firms. At the same time, the ‘social’ refers to the 
innovations the Fund has used to manage the contradictions of being a labour investor. The social 
audit screens out the most conflictive workplaces, workplace conflict resolution is encouraged 
within the process of the social audit, and again much more significantly with the economic 
training sessions which take much of the heat out of plant-level collective bargaining. These two 
concerns – the financial stake and the management of liabilities – are reconcilable to a degree. To 
the extent that the Solidarity Fund intervenes in labour relations, it mediates between firm owners 
and employees by working hard to reduce workplace conflict with the goal of increasing 
productivity, financial return, and employment security.  
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4. Conclusion 
 The Solidarity Fund is an outlier in the realm of ‘managing workers’ capital’. We know of 
no other case in which unions exert such a degree of control over the investment of workers’ 
savings, or of influence in the firm governance and workplace relations in the guise of investors. 
Not only are there very few limits, of either a legislative or judicial nature, imposed on Fund 
investment strategy, the Fund is given significant public support in reconciling union and 
financial interests. It is a most likely case of unions extending financial leverage over firms to 
advance workers interests, be they employment stability, improving labour standards or 
furthering worker and local union power. If increased union control over capital markets and 
firm-finance relations could be used to advance these goals, we would expect to the Solidarity 
Fund to succeed in doing so.  
 Our findings, summarized in Table 1, are mixed but mostly negative on this score. The 
ability to direct investment flows does not overcome the contradictions that are inherent in using 
financial levers to advance workers power in the workplace. Even in the most advantageous 
context of the Solidarity Fund, with its generous tax advantages and permissive enabling 
legislation, these contradictions are imposed by the competitive nature of capitalism. Like the 
genie released from its bottle, capital imposes its own goals – profit and accumulation – on those 
who would direct it for their own purposes. The Fund may improve workplace standards in cases 
where this does not conflict with competitive practices, and the Fund will attempt to block form 
of industrial restructuring that supress collective bargaining. But Fund investment in a firm does 
not strengthen local union power or prevent firms in which the Solidarity Fund maintains a 
minority ownership stake from making commercial decisions that run counter to workers’ 
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interests. To the limited extent to which the Fund intervenes to mediate and resolve conflict 
outside the bounds of the employer relationship, it may just as well undermine local union 
authority and militancy. It is noteworthy that local labour leaderships do not wish for the Fund to 
intervene in labour relations and the founders of the Fund themselves were keen to avoid doing 
so for the same reason: that the Fund would act to protect its investments at the expense of local 
union autonomy, which Fund leadership themselves recognized as necessary to defend workers’ 
interests at the workplace level.  
 The founders of the Solidarity Fund understood the limits and liabilities involved in 
attempts to use investment in furtherance of union goals, and in the practical work of managing 
these contradictions introduced institutional practices and rules to manage these. As we have 
shown in this paper, the social audit and economic training aspects of the Fund, while giving it 
something of a ‘social’ profile, are best understood as attempts to temper the contradictory 
expectations that local workers and business owners had of a labour investor. These tools are 
taken seriously and have real, if limited, effects on the employment relationship. They are 
oriented towards reducing conflictual workplace relations and promoting productivity in the 
interests of furthering employment stability, not advancing union power. 
 Our findings are more positive insofar as the Fund represents a form of patient capital that 
grants firms subsidized access to credit. The Solidarity Fund was the first venture capital investor 
in Quebec and remains the most significant source of external financing for small and medium 
sized businesses in the province. Along with other government-supported forms of development 
capital, the Solidarity Fund plays an important role in maintaining a more coordinated, patient 
form of firm-finance relations that still characterizes Quebec’s political economy. It occupies a 
position that would otherwise be assumed by much more aggressive, profit-maximising funds or 
the Toronto stock market, with everything that this entails for the transfer of risk to firms and 
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workers. In this limited sense then, the Solidarity Fund has attenuated some of the pressures that 
have been responsible for undermining union power across North America. By making available 
a more committed form of firm financing, the Solidarity Fund allows firms to engage in more 
cooperative work and employment practices, including collective bargaining, while sustaining 
competitive positions in North American markets. However, as the Gildan and Vidéotron cases 
demontrate, passive capital investment strategies do not prevent the Fund from finding itself in 
partnership with firms whose business strategies run counter to basic union principles, including 
freedom of association and strike solidarity.  
 From this case, we consider it unlikely that increased control over union pension funds 
could accomplish what proponents of the ‘managing workers capital’ approach expect of such 
control. Stepping into the world of finance can be perceived as an enlargement of union 
repertoires, but for labour, the limits to what can be accomplished are imposed by the nature of 
contradictory social relations under capitalism. Exerting agency in the form of an investor 
appears to enlarge the sphere of action of the labour movement when labour is at best taking 
responsibility for outcomes that it cannot control. By assuming this responsibility – for full 
employment, for better regulated capital markets and better labour standards – the labour 
movement is tacitly absolving the state of responsibilities that organized workers used to demand 
of it. These responsibilities have become diffused and now burden those who are most driven to 
find what would seem to be practical solutions. By delegating responsibility for positive 
employment outcomes to labour investors, without also creating the power to effectively control 
markets or firm decision making, unions are forced to internalize a contradiction between two 
opposed logics: the struggle of workers to defend themselves at work against the constant 
pressure from capital to rationalize their labour, reduce its costs, and increase its intensity. Labour 
unions must negotiate a compromise between these two logics. But in the Solidarity Fund we 
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have a further compromise in that a labour institution imposes this logic on itself, and in so doing 
grants it legitimacy.  
  Those who argue for increased union control over workers’ savings should be careful 
what they wish for (even if they are unlikely to get it). The Solidarity Fund should not be taken as 
a goal or model. It should be understood in its proper historical context as a fall-back position 
that, rather than pointing to a future of full employment, economic transformation, and the 
democratization of the workplace, led rather in the direction of firm-level productivity pacts and 
competitiveness-oriented collective bargaining. The advent of the Solidarity Fund was consistent 
with, and furthered, a larger ongoing shift towards a corporatist and partnership-oriented trade 
unionism in Quebec, as union critics at the time feared that it would. Though the Solidarity Fund 
may be unique, this shift towards labour’s acceptance of neoliberal capitalism as the horizon of 
the possible is far from unique (MacDonald, 2014). As far as Quebec is concerned, the repressed 
historical alternative against which the Solidarity Fund could be evaluated would be state-led 
industrial policy, the socialization of finance and work time reduction, positions that all the major 
labour centrals held up until the early 1980s. In our view, these positions remain just as relevant 
in the current context of financialized capitalism, ecological crisis and the technological 
displacement of work.  
  
	 33	
Table 1: Summary of main findings 
Solidarity Fund 
practices 
How do these practices respond to the 
institutional needs of the Fund as a 
labour investor?  
 
How do these practices 
potentially enable local 
union power over 
employers? 
Limits and contradictions of 
these practices for local 
unions and the labour 
movement 
RL network -confers a fund raising advantage 
over competing funds 
-maintains union control 
-checks internal Fund tendency to 
privilege financial returns over union 
values 
-not significant -not significant 
Economic training 
 
 
 
-information 
sharing 
-high-performance 
workplace 
orientation 
-helped overcome initial opposition 
within unions 
-gives the Fund a more ‘social’ 
profile 
-disciplines wage expectations in 
partner firms 
-lessens the liability and cost of 
labour-sponsored investment for 
firms 
 
 
 
 
 
-grants union access to the 
proprietary financial 
information and insight into 
business strategy 
 
 
 
 
-undermines the authority of 
local union bargaining 
committees 
-furthers competitiveness-
oriented bargaining and 
plant-level partnership 
Social audit -intended to protect the Fund from 
investing in workplaces that may 
tarnish its image 
(Texaco) 
-not significant -not significant 
Tax incentives -allow the Fund to accumulate 
without pursuing profit maximization 
 
-subsidized capital stabilizes 
employment levels 
 
-increases dependence on 
government policy 
-confers union legitimacy on 
subsidies to private capital 
and private pensions 
-undermines the tax base 
Passive capital 
investment 
strategies 
-minority 
ownership rule 
 
-long-term 
orientation 
-pro-employment 
restructuring 
 
-distinguishes the Fund from more 
aggressive and risk-averse financial 
actors 
-protects the Fund from expectations 
that it exert union leverage over firms 
 
-rationalizes tax advantages 
-protects unionized firms 
from profit-maximizing 
funds and pressures from 
financial markets 
 
 
 
 
-blocks recourse to anti-
union consultants, practices 
-no investment preference 
for unionized workplaces 
-passive capital investments 
can run counter to labour 
movement positions (P3s) 
-allows firms to engage in 
anti-union practices (Gildan) 
 
-confers union legitimacy on 
concession bargaining  
-restructured low cost firms 
increases competitive 
pressures on union firms 
(Entourage) 
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NOTES 																																																								1	The	authors	wish	to	acknowledge	the	financial	support	of	the	Université	de	Montréal	and	the	research	assistance	of	Audrey	Laurin-Lamothe	and	Komi	Viagbo.	2	Fund	governance	was	reformed	in	2013-2014	as	a	pro-active	response	to	a	public	investigation	into	corruption	in	the	construction	industry.	Prior	to	this	reform,	the	FTQ	controled	a	majority	of	seats	on	the	board	of	directors,	which	approves	all	investment	decisions,	and	the	president	of	the	FTQ	also	presided	over	the	board	of	the	Fund.	Today,	an	independent	president	directs	the	board	and	a	majority	of	the	seats	are	now	occupied	by	‘independent’	members	voted	by	Fund	investors.	In	practice,	the	labour	central	is	able	to	maintain	control	by	fielding	union-endorsed	candidates	and	campaigning	on	their	behalf.		
3 Wording from the Solidarity Fund website, accessed December 18, 2017 at 
[https://www.fondsftq.com/fr-ca/a-propos/qui-sommes-nous.aspx] 
4 Attempts to replicate the financial success of the Solidarity Fund in English Canada have been 
disapointing and supportive government subsidies have been discontinued in Ontario and 
Manitoba. Poor financial outcomes are largely due to a lack of union involvement and poor 
regulatory design. As Cummings and MacIntosh (2007: 483-484) have noted, “Labour unions do 
not play a monitoring role in LSIF governance, and merely rent their name to the fund. LSIF 
managers have been able to charge fees that give rise to MERs in excess of 4%, in contrast to the 
average MER for all Canadian mutual funds of 2.29% … Investors in LSIFs similarly play no 
role in the governance of the funds, as the tax incentives provided have led investors to contribute 
$Can 10 billion to the LSIFs despite poor fund performance, excessive MERs and misuse of 
capital.”  
5 The Solidarity Fund holds 35 percent of its assets in a market index fund and aligns its voting in 
shareholder assemblies with ‘socially responsible’ investment associations such as SHARE and 
the Committee for Workers Capital, sponsored by global union federations. However, it does so 
with a view to managing reputational risk rather than any serious attempt to shape labour 
practices (interview #7). “Unfortunately, looking at the overall record, it is difficult to claim that 
these efforts have done a great deal for organized labor in the United States” (Marens, 2004: 
117). 
6 This concern has given rise to various attempts at identifying what might constitute patient 
capital. Deeg and Hardie (2016) have proposed a typology of ‘varieties of capital’ based on three 
criteria: investment horizon (long versus short), whether or not the investor uses voice in firm 
governance to increase short term performance, and the likeliness of the investor to exit for 
reasons of poor short term performance. 
7 Municipal union participation in the bailout of New York City in the mid 1970s is a pregnant 
example, as is the Steelworkers partnership with private equity financier Wilbur Ross in the 
rationalization of the US steel industry in the early 2000s (see MacDonald, 2014).  8	In 2013, the Conservative federal government began reducing the federal tax incendive with a 
view to phasing it out entirely by 2017. The Liberal government of Justin Trudeau reversed 
course after lobbying efforts by the FTQ (Bouw, 2016). 
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9 Ironically enough the Solidarity Fund bears a striking resemblance to the counter-proposal of 
the Swedish Employers Association to the Meidner wage earner funds in that contributions are 
voluntary, assets are invididually owned, and there is no intention of gaining majority ownership 
and control. We are indebted to Komi Viagbo for this point.  
10 “Les interventions du Fonds de solidarité pourraient placer la FTQ en situation contradictoire 
quant aux choix des entreprises (ex. armaments), quant aux attitudes patronales de telles 
entreprises où nous serions ainsi impliquées, mais sans contrôle (ex. respect de la Loi sur le 
salaire minimum) ou encore quant aux revendications des travailleurs en négociation de telles 
entreprises ed difficulté et dépannées par le Fonds.”  
Resolution 103 proposed by SCFP (CUPE) local 313.  
11 The document was a collective effort of FTQ staff (lead author André Leclerc) titled ‘L’État 
rouage de notre exploitation’, whose literal translation is ‘The state : cog in the wheel of our 
exploitation’. It was formally adopted by the 1971 Congress of the FTQ.  
12  “Le président de la FTQ souligne que ‘le Fonds de solidarité est d’abord un outil de lutte pour 
le plein emploi qui demeure notre objectif principal.’ Il ajoute que c’est un moyen additionnel de 
‘changer les règles du jeu, par des réformes progressives,’ sur la voie de la démocratie 
économique et du socialisme démocratique. ‘Le plein emploi est le seul objectif acceptable pour 
une société qui aspire à la social-démocratie.’” (Fournier, 1991:  59). 
13 To take a representative year (2015), the Solidarity Fund accounted for 17 percent of venture 
capital fund transactions and 25 percent of total value of PE investment in the province. Canadian 
Venture and Private Equity Association, 2015. 14	“On excluait pas la possibilité d’en prendre le contrôle majoritaire si c’est pour une 
réorganisation que le propriétaire n’ai plus les moyens de suivre mais c’est transitoire, on ne 
contrôlerait pas l’entreprise, on ne le trouve pas nécessaire. C’est pas notre job, on ne veut pas. 
Personne non plus, notre rôle de syndicaliste, c’est  défendre les travailleurs, les intérêts des 
travailleurs menacés par la menace de l’emploi.”	
15 Figures from respective annual fund reports. 
16 Fund publicity gives a representative example: assuming a $47,000 annual gross salary, a 
$1000 purchase of Solidarity Fund shares costs as little as $329 after RRSP tax rebates. Accessed 
on May 19, 2017 at https://www.fondsftq.com/en/reer/pourquoi-choisir-le-fonds/comparer-le-
reer-du-fonds.aspx . Tax incentives over and above RRSP rates are capped at a $5000 purchase.  
17 The Solidarity Fund’s tax incentives periodically come under political pressure from the banks 
for this reason. Cummings and MacIntosh (2006, 2007) find that tax subsidies to labour-
sponsored investors have allowed them to outbid their competitors, depressing profit rates and 
crowding out other forms of private equity in Canada, including Quebec.  If we look at the 
Quebec capital market itself, there is no prima facie evidence that the strong presence of 
government-backed venture capital and the Solidarity Fund in particular have reduced the overall 
supply of venture capital. Indeed, Quebec’s venture capital market is among the best capitalized 
among OECD countries. Venture capital investments over the period 2011-2013 represent 0.24 of 
Quebec’s GDP, above New York (0.21), Texas (0.21) and Ontario (0.17), although significantly 
below California (0.83) and Massachusetts (0.83) (Quebec Institute of Statistics, 2014). 
Compared with these North American jurisdictions, the venture capital market in Quebec is more 
oriented to late stage, more mature firms which would otherwise seek financing on the open 
market (Ibid.). 
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18 Indeed, when in 2017 the Solidarity Fund proposed investing in PPPs – billed as long term 
investment in socially necessary infrastructure – the project was defeated in Congress by CUPE 
and sent back to the drawing board. 
19 “La vente des techniciens à Entourage devait rapporter 15 millions par année, mais les 
concessions consenties par les syndiqués ont permis d’obtenir advantage” (Vidéotron 
representative Luc Lavoie, cited in Dubuc, n.d.) 
